This paper uses international evidence to assess the impact of tripartism and other forms of government involvement in bargaining on wage moderation and wage dispersion. We find that government involvement in wage bargaining leads to a modest increase in wage moderation and reduction in wage dispersion. Historic differences in bargaining institutions between countries have greater moderating effects.
Introduction
Understanding how labour market institutions affect pay and employment outcomes is of longstanding interest to social scientists and policymakers. A major point of discussion has been the role of bargaining institutions in bringing about wage moderation and shaping the distribution of earnings since the Second World War. Economic historians have argued that post-war arrangements facilitated wage moderation that fostered investment in productivity-enhancing mass production techniques. 1 The extent of wage moderation, and critically, the depth of explicit government involvement in the bargaining process, varied significantly both between and within national economies, as the European post-war consensus eroded through the 1970s and 1980s, and new social pacts emerged in Ireland, the Netherlands, and other economies in subsequent decades. 2 Economists have offered several assessments of the relationship between bargaining structure and economic performance. 3 This literature has mainly focused on the impact of the "centralisation" of bargaining on economic outcomes -whether negotiations take place at a "local" level, or between national unions and employer organizations. Scholars of industrial relations have identified a crucial shortcoming in this literature -the theoretical and empirical work to date has done little to disentangle the effects of different approaches used to target wage moderation. This is a particularly important issue when considering different bargaining practices and the changes in the macroeconomic environment facing negotiators in recent decades relative to the Golden Age of the 1960s and early 70s. 4 States have differed in the roles played by three interest groups in negotiations over wages and working conditions: worker organizations (i.e. unions), employer organizations, and government. The early empirical literature on the effects of centralised or "corporatist" wage setting institutions paid little attention to how differences in the roles of these three groups of actors may or may not have impacted upon economic outcomes. 5 Writings on comparative industrial relations suggest that direct government involvement may lead unions and employer organizations to accept wage bargains that would not arise through bilateral negotiations. 6 The presence of government as an agent at the bargaining table could also serve as a device to encourage coordinated wage setting in the absence of highly centralised unions and employer organisations.
There is little direct evidence, however, on whether tripartism or other forms of government intervention in wage setting has actually led to wage moderation in recent decades.
Wallerstein demonstrates that centralised wage bargaining correlates with pay inequality, but offers only a limited exploration of the detailed differences in bargaining institutions. 7 Recent studies by Franz Traxler and Bernd Brandl have brought together a simple econometric framework with cross-country panel data to provide more explicit consideration of the role of bargaining institutions across countries and over time. 8 This literature, however, has left several important questions unanswered. Research by Brandl with a more explicit focus on bargaining regimes has mainly looked at their effects on wage levels and labour costs, rather than the key dimensions of wage moderation and wage dispersion. A further issue is methodological: one would like to separate out the effects of bargaining state from country fixed effects, but this is made difficult by the slow evolution of bargaining regimes within countries. Finally, the focus on current institutions in explaining outcomes since 1970 has largely ignored the potentially persistent effects of cross-country differences in labour market institutions from earlier decades.
Economic historians have debated the extent to which both industrial relations schemes and national wage and employment structures have deep historical roots, and studies to date have not attempted to quantify how the influence of past institutions on current norms and informal institutions compares to the effect of present-day formal institutions.
In this paper we use cross-country evidence to re-evaluate the influence of bargaining arrangements on post-1970 labour market outcomes. We focus on the effects of bargaining institutions on wage moderation and wage dispersion, which allows our results to speak to the debate between Eichengreen and co-authors, who argued that new bargaining methods led to wage moderation, versus scholars of industrial relations who claimed that centralised unions were able to secure larger wage increases for their members. Our analysis focuses on the role of government in the bargaining process, particularly through tripartite arrangements leading to negotiated social pacts. We develop a methodology that allows us to control for country fixed effects appropriately in the presence of slowly evolving bargaining states. Our findings show that government involvement in the wage bargaining process has a small, but statistically significant role in generating wage moderation and reduced wage dispersion. We also find that history mattered: bargaining institutions from the immediate post-war settlement continue to shape wage moderation and wage dispersion long after countries had shifted institutional regimes.
Bargaining regimes and labour market outcomes: theory, evidence, and history
Economic theory offers several arguments as to how the relative centralization of bargaining may affect wage outcomes. High level (often national) unions and employer organisations may internalize inter-firm or inter-industry tradeoffs that are external to negotiating parties under fragmented bargaining. Once wages are agreed, the centralised nature of labour market institutions is key to achieving wage moderation, by preventing shirking on agreements by either workers or firms. On the other hand, decentralised bargaining may bring about greater wage discipline in unions for whom higher wages will reduce demand for labour in the firms in which they are active. A further counterpoint is that centralised unions may be able to secure higher wage settlements if the effect of collective arrangements is mainly to increase the bargaining power of organised labour.
Consistent with these opposing forces, Calmfors and Driffil argue for a U-shaped relationship between economic performance and the centralisation, with the effects of internalised spillovers in wage bargaining and fragmented union discipline dominating the tails of the bargaining distribution. 9 Some empirical studies find evidence of a relationship between centralisation of bargaining and economic performance, through greater employment, moderated wage growth, and relative wage equalisation (Bruno and Sachs; Layard, Nickell and Jackman; Wallerstein) , while others report ambiguous effects (OECD; Flanagan).
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A significant issue in this literature is how centralised or so-called "corporatist"
bargaining is measured. Most follow Calmfors and Driffil by ranking countries on an index of centralisation of bargaining, based primarily on the "level" at which negotiations take place.
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Early studies typically based this measure on union structure -countries in which unions are mainly firm-specific rank as decentralised, while states with national confederations of unions are centralised. SOSKICE was among the first to observe that centralisation as measured does not necessarily overlap with the coordination of wage setting. 12 In the 1980s (and indeed in subsequent decades as well), several states with "decentralised" firm-level bargaining according to Calmfors and Driffil actually feature high levels of wage coordination, due to the role of employer organizations, union governance, or links between bargaining partners and the government.
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The last point is of particular interest here, as many industrial relations scholars have suggested that tripartite models which introduce the government as a bargaining partner could promote moderation and compression of the earnings distribution. Several reasons have been offered to support this prediction. Unions may agree to lower wage increases in exchange of concessions that are credible only when government is at the bargaining table. 14 Others argue that revised tripartist models of wage moderation result from the implicit threat that if unions do not engage in negotiation on terms favoured by the government, tight monetary policy and austerity would result in high unemployment in the short term, with reduced wage settlements following in the longer run. 15 A further possibility is that tripartism might be the device that provides wage coordination in the absences of national-level unions and employer organisations.
Soskice suggests that guidance from central government encourages wage coordination in Japan;
in the Singaporean case, an explicitly tripartite bargaining structure is inserted into a framework of relatively decentralised unions and employers. 16 Other scholars have been sceptical of the ability of tripartite bargaining approaches to shift labour market outcomes. The ability of governments to transmit their intentions to labour market outcomes depends on the aptitude of government negotiators, their ability to successfully influence proceedings, and whether it is feasible to target real economic outcomes under uncertainty through an indirect mechanism such as wage bargaining. Democratically elected governments work within limited time horizons, dampening incentives to achieve moderation versus political economy considerations related to the electorate. Further, the emergence of tripartism or other models of consensual bargaining may occur at lower cost in some countries than in others. allow for an examination of trends in wage growth relative to productivity (a key point in any arguments regarding moderation, see Baccaro and Simoni 27 ), we use statistical evidence on aggregate labour productivity from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) 10-sector database. 28 The data and sources used are described in further detail in the Appendix.
We focus on explaining two outcome measures that are in keeping with the existing (theoretical) literature on bargaining institutions. The first is the (real) wage-productivity gap, which we take as the ratio between wages and output per worker. This measure has obvious links to ideas regarding economic efficiency, as well as to the classic debate on wage moderation -if workers are accepting smaller wage increases so that firms can invest excess profits, this ratio should be smaller. The second outcome we examine is wage dispersion. Greater equity in wage outcomes is often an explicit aim of the actors engaged in wage negotiations, and ideally our results would speak to whether or not particular bargaining arrangements tend to achieve this aim. To compute the wage-productivity gap, we use sector-level wages for all countries and all years for which we have labour market data and evidence on bargaining institutions (as outlined below), and divide these by national output per unit of labour. 29 We use the standard deviation of the sectoral wage observations in the country in each year as our wage dispersion measure. 30 The wage data used refer to ILO series that combine male and female workers. We have much wider country coverage in observations that combine both genders than for only male or only female workers, but the data suggest similar patterns (and in particular similar regression results) if we extend coverage to all available data. Table 1 summarizes wage and labour productivity statistics for the 22 countries included in our sample. The summary statistics for the spread of earnings from the ILO data are well in line with other estimates of the earned income distribution for these countries. In terms of real hourly wages and output, Canada, Denmark, Netherland, Norway, and Switzerland are near the top of the rankings, with Greece, Portugal, Singapore, and Israel located near the bottom. These figures do not account for changes in wages over time, differences in sectoral composition between countries, and the timing of any missing observations. Canada, Great Britain, and the United States exhibit relatively high wage dispersion, while Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, and the Nordic economies are towards the other end of the spectrum.
( wage dispersion depending on the relative centralisation of wage bargaining. National-level bargaining produces smaller (sectoral) wage gaps than bargaining focused at industry or local levels. This pattern is well in line with existing theories related to the internalisation of crosssectoral spillovers in the bargaining process when bargaining occurs at the national level.
Differences in real wages and productivity are similarly associated with the level of bargaining.
Real hourly wages and labour productivity are lower where national-level bargaining exists, but the relationship with the wage-productivity gap is the opposite. We also find differences in wage dispersion for different levels of government involvement in the bargaining process. Dispersion is greatest when the government plays no direct role in bargaining, falling significantly when government becomes active partners in determining wage outcomes. While the ranking in wages and productivity by extent of government intervention is less obvious, the pattern for the wage-productivity gap suggests that the intermediate category of government involvement, in tripartite negotiations, delivers the most wage moderation.
( Table 2 )
Statistical methodology and estimation results
We develop statistical models to explore four research questions linked to the two hypotheses 
In equation (1), Y ijt is the labour market outcome of interest observed in country i, sector j, and year t. On the right-hand side, we include a constant term (β 0 ), a time trend (t), and indicator for national level bargaining (N it ), a vector of government involvement states (Z it ) -as with bargaining, these are common across sectors, sets of dummies for sector (s j ) and country (c i ), a set of dummies for the original unit of pay 34 (u ijt ) which varies across sectors in some countries, and a vector of other national, time-varying controls (X it ). 35 Our main interest in the baseline regression in (1) is the sign and magnitude of the coefficients β 2 and γ measuring the effects of bargaining states N and Z. In accordance with our research questions, and consistent with much of the existing literature, we focus on the effects of bargaining regimes on two direct measures of labour market outcomes associated respectively with notions of moderation -the wageproductivity gap, and equity -the dispersion of real hourly wages. In the model of wage dispersion, the dependent variable becomes Y it , as dispersion is the observed standard deviation among the industry wages in each country/year cell.
The discussion in previous sections illustrated how we might expect both differences in bargaining regimes and differences in country-specific institutions to cause differences in labour market outcomes. We adopt a simple empirical strategy to distinguish between these two sources of differences in labour market outcomes. Based on annual industry -country observations we employ TSCS (time-series and cross-section) techniques. The estimation is complicated because of the nature of the main variables of interest in our analysis -the bargaining regime dummies (H and Z) -that have little within-country variance and show much more variation across countries than over time. The fixed country effects are likely to soak up most of the explanatory power of the slowly changing bargaining regime indicators. This aggravates the inefficiency of the fixed effects estimator and may lead to unreliable point estimates that would then lead to incorrect inferences in the same way that a biased estimator could. Therefore, we employ four estimators to identify and address possible biases: pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors, fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), and Hausman-Taylor (HT). 36 In the Appendix we discuss in detail the advantages and disadvantages of each of the estimators employed.
For questions c) and d), we extend the Hausman-Taylor estimation of equation (1) for wage moderation (and similarly when explaining wage dispersion) with the addition of a measure of historical bargaining institutions (the corporatism index):
where H i refers to historic bargaining institutions and  is the effect of these institutions on current outcomes, all else equal. RN it and RZ it are residuals estimated from auxiliary regressions following ideas in Plümper and Troeger where we decompose the contemporary bargaining regime indicators total effects into a fixed (historic) effect and a time-varying policy innovation effect, captured by the residuals. 37 Results from the auxiliary regressions are reported in the Appendix, Table A2 .
( Table 3 ) Table 3 presents regression results linking the wage-productivity gap to bargaining state.
We also include controls for national income (in the form of GDP per capita in '000 PPP Dollars), a time trend, and the salary or wage unit used in the original source data. 38 The OLS specification in column (1) shows significant differences in the wage-productivity gap associated with bargaining regimes. Consistent with the summary statistics in Table 2 , tripartite arrangements are associated with significant wage moderation. The sign on the coefficient for government imposed wage settlements is also negative, but is small in magnitude and falls well short of statistical significance. We also find little effect here of the level of bargaining, which has a positive sign but is estimated imprecisely. (Table 5) The results presented thus far show that current bargaining regimes do matter for wage moderation, a finding that persists after a range of approaches to control for (unobserved) institutional effects and the possible endogeneity of the bargaining regimes. For wage dispersion, we find that tripartite models do not have as clear an effect, suggesting that the influence of government in negotiations is more often to suppress the level of overall wage growth, rather than to target different sectors based on current levels of pay. In Table 5 , we extend our baseline models to directly explore the role of historical institutions in shaping labour market outcomes in the present day. We estimate equation (2) introduced earlier using the Hausman-Taylor methodology, which allows us to contrast the effects of historic wage coordination measures from 1950s with the effects of contemporary bargaining regimes. (tripartism or government imposing wages, respectively) are much as we found in earlier models that control for country and industry factors through fixed effects and other approaches, and these coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Second, we find large, significant effects of historic wage coordination, which dominates the impact of current bargaining institutions.
These results suggest that both current bargaining regimes and historical institutions matter in understanding international differences in wage moderation. National choice of the formal institutional framework in which bargaining takes place today does appear to have observable effects on wage moderation and dispersion, but the institutional setup found in the immediate post-war era (which in many countries reflected the strength of organized labour and the importance of central government even earlier in the twentieth century) casts a large shadow on outcomes in the present day.
Discussion and conclusions
The entrance of government into wage bargaining is one of the major developments in global industrial relations in the last 65 years. Differences in institutional frameworks and national policies regarding wage bargaining are often identified as a source of variation in wage structures between countries. This paper seeks to achieve two aims: first, to bring a new methodological approach to the question at hand that provides robust evidence regarding the relationship between government involvement in bargaining arrangements and wage outcomes, and second, evaluate whether past institutions continue to shape bargaining outcomes in the present day. We find some support of our first hypothesis (H1) that tripartism and other forms of government intervention in the bargaining process have consistent, but modest effects on labour market outcomes. Wage moderation is greater in the presence of tripartism, with workers accepting wage increases that are lower relative to productivity growth, as compared to states without government involvement in bargaining. Wage dispersion is much less affected by tripartite bargaining, which suggests that the influence of government may have been primarily on overall wage levels, rather than targeting the pay of particular sectors.
Historical bargaining arrangements, measured here as the degree of corporatism in national labour markets in the immediate post-war settlement between 1950 and 1960, appear to have larger effects than current institutions -a finding strongly in support of our second hypothesis (H2). One explanation for this finding is that post-Second World War arrangements reflect labour market "culture" in the early twentieth century, something that is observed to some extent in terms of international differences in work time and work sharing over the long run. What lessons do these findings carry for governments and policy makers in the present day? The first one is: know your history. Negotiated wage outcomes depend on the interaction of formal and informal institutions in the bargaining arena. If informal institutions are strongly dependent on behaviour conditioned by significant changes in bargaining arrangements that emerged circa 1950, then it is relatively unsurprising that reshaping bargaining arrangements today has a relatively small effect on the structure of pay. The second lesson we would draw is that "critical junctures" 43 matter. The Second World War was a major international shock that permitted the entrance of government into what were previously private labour markets both during and after the conflict. The changes that occurred during that critical juncture continue to have ongoing ramifications for how workers are paid today, even in markets where governments have largely withdrawn from the formalities of bargaining. 28. A second database is available that includes sectoral data for a limited number of countries; we have not used this so far as we would lose much of the compelling variation in labour market institutions.
29. Ideally we would use sector-based national income estimates here, but they are available over time only for a small set of countries, which do not include many of the states with the more interesting institutional histories.
30. We have also tried alternatives such as the mean absolute deviation within each country year cell, or the ratio between "skilled" and "unskilled" sectors. These approaches yield quantitatively similar results.
31. The wage coordination in the Visser database is highly collinear with bargaining level, and analysis with that measure yields similar results. Visser, "ICTWSS Database".
32. Hemker, Sijtsma, and Molenaar, "Selection of Unidimensional Scales"; Mokken and Lewis, "A Nonparametric Approach".
33. Allard and Lindert, "Euro-Productivity and Euro-Jobs".
34. While we have converted all monthly, daily, and weekly salaries and wages into hourly form, there may be compensating differences associated with differences in contractual form, or other unobserved differences between pay period and earnings.
35. The Appendix outlines how we converted series with different currencies and contract form on the most consistent basis possible. In exploratory regressions we included a series of controls for whether original pay was reported monthly, weekly, daily, or hourly, but these are statistically insignificant and their inclusion has little effect on the other coefficients. We also experimented with controls for whether series were based on the wages of male workers, female workers, or a mix of the two; in the results that follow, we present findings based on the final set of series (it contained by far the most observations).
Results are broadly similar in the gender-specific data, and we have also estimated models which pool the series and include series type controls, with little change on the overall results.
36. Hausman and Taylor, "Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects".
37. Plümper and Troeger, "Efficient Estimation".
38. We have experimented with union density as an additional explanatory variable in alternative specification of this model. It is at best an imperfect proxy for the importance of labour organizations on national bargaining structures, and is not available consistently for all countries in our analysis.
Nevertheless, the inclusion or exclusion of this variable has little effect on other coefficients. In additional regression we have interacted union density with bargaining institutions, but these interactions almost universally fall far short of statistical significance, and fail to add much of substance to the overall picture.
39. Overall, the standard errors appear smaller compared with the RE ones because our HT estimator does not allow for robust standard errors. As a robustness check we also estimated FEVD models and the results were similar to the HT results reported. Because our sample size is quite large we chose to report the HT results given that the FEVD estimator is originally developed for small sample TSCS data.
40. To address concerns about serial correlation in variables run all models estimated thus far on transformed data of five-year averages as we then have 8 periods in total; the results remain stable and very similar to the ones reported.
41. Plümper and Troeger, "Efficient Estimation". 13.5 (4.3) 18.6 (6.5) .74 (.14) 2.4 (1.6) Industry and 'local' level wage bargaining 15.4 (5.4) 22. 1 (6.9) .71 (.18) 3.2 (1.7)
Government imposed wages 14.7 (5.4) 17.3 (7.4) .76 (.19) 2.0 (1.7) Government in tripartite negotiations 11.7 (4.8) 17.7 (7.2) .66 (.13) 2.6 (1.5) Government has indirect or no involvement in bargaining 15.9 (4.9) 21. 6 (6.3) . Allard and Lindert (2006) . Level of significance is denoted as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Institutional variables
The 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) , government intervention in wage bargaining (GOVINT, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) , level at which wage bargaining takes place (LEVEL, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) , mandatory extension of collective agreements (EXT, 0, 12) , national minimum wage (NMW, 0,1,2), union density (UD, 0-100), adjusted bargaining coverage (ADJCOV, 0-100), and centralisation of wage bargaining (CENT, 0-100).
The bargaining and government intervention variables were used to construct a series of dummy variables to capture different bargaining states. Institutional measures from the 1950s are from Allard and Lindert's coordination index, which we have rescaled from 0 to 2.
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Other variables
Labour productivity is from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. It consists of GDP per hour, expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis US dollars. fixed effects. Importantly, the second drawback of the FE model becomes very serious in the case of variables that have very little within variance such as the bargaining regime dummy set in our analysis that show much more variation across countries than over time. This inefficiency leads to highly unreliable point estimates and may thus cause wrong inferences in the same way a biased estimator could.
A reasonable compromise in these circumstances is offered by the Hausman-Taylor procedure and the FEVD (fixed effects vector decomposition) procedure of Plümper and Troeger. 47 The Hausman- Taylor regressors. An important feature of the Hausman-Taylor procedure is that the non-correlation assumptions can be tested, so that the method need not rely on totally a priori assumptions.
FEVD decomposes the latent FE into an unexplained part and a part explained by the time invariant or the rarely changing variables. The procedure is similar to that suggested by Hsiao but applied to small sample TSCS data. 48 Appendix .27
Notes: All regressions are clustered by unit of observation and robust standard errors OLS estimator is applied. The sole explanatory variable in each regression is the historic index of wage coordination. Level of significance is denoted as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
